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Abstract
This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various
insurance products aimed to protect against financial risks associated with long-term care needs.
Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these
stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance.
Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare
losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that
information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses while selection
plays little role.
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1 Introduction
Because of rapidly aging population, financing and providing long-term care (LTC hereafter)
to older individuals is an important and growing problem in developed countries.1 In OECD
countries, the population of 80 years old and more is expected to grow from 4% of the total
population in 2010 to 10% by 2050 (OECD, 2011). Estimates of the probability that someone
approaching retirement will use a nursing home at some point in his life ranges from 35% to 50%
in the U.S. (Brown and Finkelstein, 2009; Hurd et al., 2017). Despite increasing demand, OECD
countries are still spending relatively little on long-term care services, at least as a percentage of
GDP. Private long-term expenditures as a share of GDP were similar in Canada and the United
States at roughly 0.3% of GDP.2
To get a sense of the magnitude of private expenditures in Canada, out-of-pocket costs for a
public nursing home is at most $24,000 a year representing roughly a third of total cost to the
government 3 in the province of Que´bec (see Boyer et al. (2019a) for more on the out-of-pocket
costs in the different Canadian provinces), compared to over 90,000 USD in the United States
(Genworth, 2019). Given that, on average, individuals stay 5 years in these facilities, such long-
term care expenses can represent a high burden for households with low savings. Moreover,
public nursing homes only provide “minimum basic services” so that an individual who would
like to receive “higher quality services” would have to resort to a private nursing home whose cost
varies between $40,000 and $60,000 a year in Canada.4 Finally, the waiting time for accessing
the public service is close to 10 months so that, while waiting for a bed in a Canadian nursing
home, individuals need to find alternative (private) solutions. Hence, LTC risk is associated
with potentially important financial risks for households despite subsidies from the government.
In order to cover for the risk that public care is not enough or is unavailable when additional
1Long term care is defined as the care for people needing daily living support over a prolonged period of time.
Support can be provided with activities of daily living (such as bathing, dressing, eating, getting in and out of bed,
toileting and continence) or instrumental activities of daily living (which include preparing meals, cleaning, doing the
laundry, taking medication, getting to places beyond walking distance, shopping, managing money affairs, and using
the telephone and nowadays the Internet). The loss of autonomy is most often associated with old age and should
be clearly distinguished from illness, disability and handicap.
2Recent OECD Health statistics (2018) suggest that, in 2016, the 30 OECD countries spent, on average, 1.33%
of GDP on long-term care services (with 1.10% of GDP coming from public sources and 0.23% coming from private
sources). For the same year total expenditure on long-term care services in the United States represented 0.87% of
GDP, with 0.24% of GDP coming from non-government sources. In Canada, total expenditures on long-term care
services represented 1.48% of GDP, with private sources representing 0.31% of GDP.
3Unless otherwise specified, amounts are expressed in Canadian dollars throughout the paper.
4The two provinces in which we conducted our study, namely Que´bec and Ontario, provide dependents with
means-tested reduction in fees. In addition, in the province of Que´bec, tax-credits for formal care are available.
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services are required, Canadians can buy a private LTC insurance policy that pays off when
they are declared to have two ADL impairments or more (payments cannot be retroactive).
Contrary to some other countries, bundling LTC insurance with some other financial products
is quite limited.
Despite the high potential financial risk for individuals and households, very few choose
to insure privately against such risks (Pestieau and Ponthiere, 2011). In Canada, the share
of total LTC spending covered by private insurance was around 0.5% in 2010 while for OECD
countries, it was less than 2% (OECD, 2011). According to a Canadian Life and Health Insurers
Association representative, the take-up rate in Que´bec for long-term care insurance policies was
around 1.7% in 2015.5 This situation is often coined the Long-Term Care Insurance Puzzle.
The objective of this paper is to explain low take-up rate of LTC insurance (LTCI hereafter),
and to measure the welfare costs of (demand side) choice frictions and (supply side) asymmetric
information. To do so, we partnered with Asking Canadians, a Canadian online panel survey
organization to field a survey on LTCI, in the fall of 2016. We selected randomly 2000 panel
members aged 50 to 70 in the two most populous provinces of Canada, Ontario and Que´bec.
We then matched each respondent with a health microsimulation model capable of estimating
personalized lifetime exposure to disability, nursing home and formal care (Boisclair et al., 2016).
This allows to estimate the actual risks faced by households and potentially covered by insurers
and to compare those with risk perceptions we elicit in the survey. We also survey respondents
about their knowledge of LTC and institutional details and preferences for care which have been
shown to be correlated with demand for LTCI (Brown et al., 2012). We then build a stated-
preferences experiment to study demand for LTCI.6 The second part of our survey consists of
an experiment where we presented each respondent with the prospect of purchasing a LTCI
product. These scenarios differ in terms of the benefit paid in case of dependency, the premium
paid and the provision of an embedded term life insurance contract if the respondent dies prior
to age 85. From survey responses and experimental variation in contract characteristics, we can
infer the participants’ demand for LTCI and investigate whether there is adverse or advantageous
selection in this insurance market.
5In the U.S., only about 10.8 percent of those 60 years and older held such a policy in 2009 (Brown and Finkelstein,
2009). Put differently, in 2010, 10 million Americans were covered by some sort of long-term care insurance policy,
compared to 385,000 Canadians (see clhia.uberflip.com/i/354914-clhia-report-on-long-term-care-policy/
7?). Liu and Liu (2019) report that, as of 2014, there were 7.2 million private LTCI policies in force in the United
States.
6See Louviere et al. (2000) on the merits and disadvantages of stated-choice experiments.
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We build on the methodology developed by Einav et al. (2010) and Handel et al. (2019). The
former uses revealed preferences to estimate the demand and supply curves of employer-provided
health insurance using individual-level data from a multinational firm. The combination of
estimated demand and supply curves enables to evaluate the welfare losses associated with
mispricing due to asymmetric information (whether it is adverse or advantageous selection). We
extend this approach to stated-preference data using experimental variation in prices. Handel
et al. (2019) estimates the extent to which the presence of information frictions in the health
insurance market would lead to inefficiencies and how policy interventions for correcting these
frictions may effectively be welfare increasing or decreasing.7 Following a similar approach,
we estimate the welfare impact of those information frictions in the Canadian LTCI market
according to our survey.
Our results confirm the existence of under-insurance for LTC. Focusing on the baseline
contract offering a $2000 LTC monthly benefit without any life insurance, our model predicts
that the proportion of agents optimally buying LTC should be around 30% while the equilibrium
take-up rate is only 20%. Asymmetric information explains only a very tiny fraction of this
gap (in the absence of asymmetric information, the equilibrium take-up rate would decrease by
0.4%), and consequently generates a very small welfare cost. The largest part of the take-up gap
is rather explained by information frictions regarding the general knowledge of LTCI products
(awareness), and the knowledge of LTC costs and institutional context in general, with a much
smaller role for misperceptions regarding survival and disability risks. We estimate the overall
welfare cost of these information frictions at around 18% of the welfare obtained at the social
optimum.
Few papers combine stated-preference and revealed preference data to study this market.
Exceptions are Ameriks et al. (ming) and Ameriks et al. (2016). The latter study uses strategic
survey questions along with balance sheet data from the Vanguard Research Initiative (VRI)
to estimate preferences, within a well-defined life-cycle model, to explain the low demand for
LTCI products. They find that 60% of the panel members would buy LTCI according to their
model. This gap between actual and reported demand can be explained by a lack of interest
on the demand side as well as poor insurance product features on the supply side. In our
framework, we elicit directly preferences of respondents allowing us to compute the demand
curve using experimental variation in prices. We also consider the supply and demand side
7See also Handel and Kolstadt (2015) and Spinnewijn (2017).
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jointly, allowing us to investigate selection and equilibrium in that market. Another related
paper is Dardanoni and Li Donni (2016) who use a framework similar to ours but in a revealed
preference context. Their approach rests on evaluating welfare losses from mixture type models
using external estimates of the price elasticity of demand for LTCI. They estimate large welfare
loss from unpriced heterogeneity and use large estimates of the price elasticity of demand (-
3.5 and -2). In our framework, we estimate this elasticity directly from the stated-preference
experiment and find price elasticities (average around −0.65) consistent with Ameriks et al.
(2016) who find demand price elasticity below one (in absolute value) for 80% of their sample.
Finally our paper can be related to the developing literature on behavioral insurance.8 This
literature focuses on the importance of taking into account behavioral constraints (i.e., specific
individual cognitive factors and limited rationality) when it comes to explaining individuals’
insurance behavior. Insurance choices are quite different from other (risky) choices and, as such,
are impacted differently by behavioral constraints. While some papers have already integrated
these constraints into models of insurance for disasters (Friedl et al., 2014), for genetic testing
(Hoy et al., 2014), for annuitization (Bommier and Grand, 2014), for health damages (Handel
and Kolstadt, 2015) etc., to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first empirical paper
to study the impact of behavioral constraints on LTCI take-up and to quantify their welfare
impacts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the survey and the questionnaire we
use. Section 3 shows descriptive evidence from the survey. We develop an equilibrium model for
LTCI products, which we apply to stated-preference data from our survey, in Section 4. Section
5 contains the results we obtain, while Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
We first describe the survey we have run, before moving to how we have computed the individ-
uals’ LTC risk from their survey answers.
2.1 Survey
Partnering with Asking Canadians, a Canadian online panel survey organization, we conducted
a survey on LTCI in late autumn 2016. We randomly selected 2000 panel members aged 50 to
8For an overview of the issues related to behavioral insurance, see Richter et al. (2014).
5
70 residing in the two largest and most populous provinces of Canada, Ontario and Que´bec.
Participants were rewarded for their participation with loyalty rewards from major retailers.
Despite those efforts, some groups remain slightly underrepresented, in particular low-educated
and low-income groups. We stratified by age, gender, province and education groups (three
levels) and used the Canadian Labor Force Survey of 2014 (the last year available) to re-weigh the
data. The effect of weighing was minimal on our analysis. For example, the median household
income we estimate in the survey is $65,000 for the province of Que´bec, while the equivalent
number from the Social Policy Simulation Database (SPSD) for 2016 is $69,000. The 25th
percentile of household income in the SPSD is $41,110 for Que´bec while we estimate it to
be $38,000 in our survey. Hence, once reweighed, our survey appears representative of the
population aged 50-70 in Que´bec and Ontario.
A copy of the questionnaire (in text format) is found in Appendix C. It has four major
parts.9 The first three parts asked respondents about socioeconomic characteristics, reasons for
having purchased (or not) LTCI, risk perceptions and, their preferences regarding the type of
LTC they would prefer to receive. For some of these questions, we used a formulation taken
from Brown et al. (2012). For questions where we expected a significant fraction of missing
information, such as savings and income, we used unfolding brackets. We then used multiple
imputation to impute missing values with information from the bracketing, conditional on basic
socio-demographic co-variates (age, gender).
The fourth and last part of the survey consisted of a stated-preference experiment. Respon-
dents were presented with the prospect of purchasing a LTCI product. These scenarios differ
in the benefit paid under LTCI, the premium and a term life insurance if the respondent dies
prior to age 85. The introductory text is reproduced below (the equivalent exists in French for
Que´bec residents who are mostly French speakers).
We are going to show you some simple insurance policies and ask you to rate those. You can
assume that if you were to have two or more limitations in activities of daily living, the insurance
company offering you this product would pay the benefits no matter what the circumstances. Once
you receive benefits, you do not pay any premiums.
Each product has three attributes: a) a monthly premium you have to pay; b) a monthly
benefit if you have 2 or more limitations in activities of daily living, starting 3 months after
your limitations have been verified; and c) a payout to your survivors if you die before age
85. Assume that if you are healthy and you stop paying premiums for 3 consecutive months,
the contract is cancelled and you lose coverage. The premium cannot increase once you have
9Asking Canadians validates completed questionnaires based on a number of indicators, such as the time of
completion, and drops respondents whose answers appear questionable.
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purchased the product. Finally, the benefits are adjusted for inflation (indexed).
We presented scenarios using the following representation (with p, bltc and blife replaced by
values in Canadian dollars):
While healthy Once you have at least 2 ADLs When you die
You pay p You receive bltc Your survivors receive blife
We use a simple LTCI contract on purpose. In order to avoid uncertainty about the future
premiums we explicitly mention that premiums could not increase once the contract is signed.
This means of course that real premiums are decreasing. We also insisted on the possibility of
lapse-risk in the sense that respondents were made aware that if a payment was not made for
some time, it would lead to the termination of the contract. We mentioned that there is no
risk regarding payment of benefits. This meant that if the respondent had two or more ADL
impairments, then the insurance company would for sure pay the benefits that were contracted
upon. We also insisted that the product is offered by a trusted insurance company. We explicitly
wanted respondents to dismiss the risks associated with nit-picky insurers (see Bourgeon and
Picard (2014)) and the insurer’s credit risk; in other words, we wanted to avoid having them
think of payment risk. Finally, LTCI benefits are indexed to inflation. Apart from wanting to
offer a situation that replicates reality (i.e., LTCI protection is usually indexed to inflation),
we also wanted respondents to know that the amount of LTC services they would receive is
independent of when they become disabled.
We presented five of those scenarios to each respondent. Each time we asked respondents for
the likelihood with which he or she would purchase this product if it were offered by a trusted
insurance company. Possible answers ranged from 0%, meaning there was no chance whatsoever
that the respondent would purchase the LTCI product, and 100%, meaning that the respondent
would certainly purchase that product.10 We consider jointly LTCI and term life insurance
contracts because of the potential desirability of having some life insurance protection in case
one dies early, prior to facing significant disability risk.11 This bundling may be particularly
10For analysis we re-scale those responses to be between zero and one.
11Note, however, that insurance products in which LTC and life insurance benefits are bundled are still
not very common in Canada, even though bundled products that include LTC insurance have been dis-
cussed for a long time in the scientific community. In particular, these products offer a combination of
annuities with LTC (Getzen, 1988; Webb, 2009; Brown and Warshawsky, 2013; Glenzer and Achou, 2019)
as well as universal life insurance plans to which policyholders add the right to purchase at set dates
(say at the 5th and 10th year policy anniversary) home care insurance coverage. These are known as fu-
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interesting for respondents who have some bequest motive. The reason we asked for probabilities
is that they convey considerably more information than a yes or no answer and allow to account
for the fact that scenarios are incomplete (Manski, 1999). One advantage of asking for the
probability with which one would purchase a contract is that we can use these probabilities
directly in our analysis without having to make any assumptions about the functional form that
leads to a yes/no answer.12
Each scenario is constructed in the following way. For each respondent, a monthly LTCI
benefit bltc is first randomly picked from the distribution [2000, 1/3; 3000, 1/3; 4000, 1/3]. We
also pick randomly a benefit for the life insurance component of scenario, blife from the dis-
tribution [0, 3/5; 10000, 1/5, 25000, 1/5]. In Canada, most insurers only use information on age
and gender to price this type of insurance. Some insurers will underwrite insurance on the
basis of pre-existing medical conditions but premiums are not a function of health status. In
our research design, we therefore concentrate on offering premiums consisting of an age-gender
actuarial premium, computed from a microsimulation model, and a price adjustment factor
which is randomized but centered on 1. Hence, the average premium offered to respondents
of a certain age and gender group is equal to the actuarial premium we compute from our mi-
crosimulation approach. Hence, we first use the health microsimulation model COMPAS, which
we describe below, to compute by age and gender the actuarial premium associated to these
benefits, assuming a 3% discount rate. These premiums can be compared to those observed in
the market. We obtained from CAA-Que´bec (which is the Que´bec equivalent of the AAA in
the United States) premium data corresponding to similar levels of coverage to those presented
to respondents. In Table 1, we report average estimates in the sample. These premiums are
close to those observed in the market, although our model estimates are higher than market
premiums for men in general, and for women at younger ages. They are, however, lower for
women at older ages. We conclude from this exercise that our modelling of disability risk is
close to that used by insurance companies in the industry.
ture purchase option benefits (see, for instance, www.rbcinsurance.com/files/00105/file-105623.pdf; file
last retrieved 23 October 2019). In the United States, 260,000 so-called life-LTC hybrid policies were sold
in 2017, compared to only 70,000 stand-alone LTCI policies (www.forbes.com/sites/jamiehopkins/2018/
10/10/hybrid-life-insurance-policies-increasingly-popular-as-long-term-care-funding-strategy/
#24a1fac61efa; file last retrieved 23 October 2019).
12Note that waiting to purchase LTCI has no significant option value. On the opposite, waiting runs the risk
of sizeable increases in the insurance premium as agents grow older. Also, there is little reclassification risk (the
premium is fixed for the duration of the contract and the lump-sum payment is made conditional on suffering from
at least two ADL, irrespective of the severity of dependency).
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We denote by ch the actuarial premium for each class of risk (by gender and age), h, represent-
ing the expected cost expressed monthly for the expected duration of the contract. Finally, we
create exogenous variation in premiums by drawing a factor τ from the vector (0.6,0.8,1.0,1.2,1.4)
with probability 1/5 for each element.
The premium is given by p = τch. Hence a scenario consists of a triple (p, bltc, blife). Each
respondent is offered five scenarios, drawn at random as explained above.
2.2 COMPAS
There is no detailed projection of disability risk in Canada that would allow us to construct
personalized risk estimates for respondents in our survey. We use the microsimulation model
COMPAS that was developed to project the long-term evolution of health and health care use
in Canada (Boisclair et al., 2016).13 The structure of the model follows from other models such
as the Future Elderly Model (Goldman et al., 2005). Each individual in the model has many
characteristics :
• Socio-demographic characteristics: age, sex, immigration status, education level, income
bracket
• Diseases: diabetes, high blood pressure, heart diseases, stroke, cancer, lung diseases, de-
mentia
• risk factors: smoking, obesity
• Disability: limitations in ADLs and Instrumental ADLs (IADL)
• Long-term care: formal home care, nursing home
Based on these characteristics, the core of the model consists of a Markovian transition
model of diseases, risk factors, disability and long-term care characteristics. These transitions
are based on a set of transition models which were estimated using the National Population
Health Survey (1994-2010). The transition model has been satisfactorily tested by simulating
on original 1994 data the trajectories of respondents in the NPHS until 2010 and comparing
distribution of outcomes. The model delivers simulated life-trajectories conditional on a set of
initial conditions. Given the large number of variables, one cannot construct a transition matrix
across all these states. Instead, each respondent can be simulated a large number of times and
13A detailed description of the model can be found here.
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an individualized set of disability and mortality risks can be computed by averaging over these
simulations. When designing the questionnaire for our survey, we deliberately asked questions
we could then feed directly into the health transition matrix of COMPAS. In particular, we
asked respondents for their education level, their health conditions (same as in COMPAS) and
smoking habits. Nevertheless, data limitations are likely to impact some of the calculations
we make. COMPAS uses NPHS data which records the location of respondents at the time
of the survey but no location is available when the respondent has been found to have died.
Since nursing home stays tend to occur more frequently at the end of life, this could impact our
estimates. Hurd et al. (2017) find that shorter stays, in particular those near the end of life are
missed by core interviews in the Health and Retirement Study. Although short stays may be
missed, they may matter more for policyholders than for insurers, as these stays are typically
shorter than the deductible threshold of LTCI policies (3-5 months). In particular, it may be
that we underestimate the individual risks while respondents have correct expectations about
such risks.
Hence, we are able to construct a distribution of individualized disability and mortality risks
as a function of a large number of characteristics. Since insurers do not use these characteristics
to price LTCI products, we will be able to use these unused pricing characteristics to test for
asymmetric information and quantify its effect on take-up of LTCI.
3 Descriptive Evidence
We first focus on describing who has or not LTCI in our survey, and on their stated reason for
(not) buying it.
3.1 Take-Up, Knowledge and Awareness of LTCI
Table 2 reports the number of people with (the rightmost column) and without (the leftmost
column) LTCI. We find that the take-up rate of LTCI is low, at 10.5%, at a similar level as that
found in the U.S (around 10.8% in 2009, see Brown and Finkelstein, 2009). We also report the
respondents’ level of knowledge about LTCI products. Among those who did not purchase LTCI,
39.8% reported having no knowledge about the product, and 7.9% reported not knowing what
the product was. Others judged that such policies were too expensive (19%) or unnecessary
(14%).
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Among the respondents who were covered by LTCI, close to two-thirds (65%) knew little
about that type of products whereas 5.5% said they knew nothing at all. The main reason for
having purchased an LTCI policy is that they were offered one through one channel or another:
only 9.2% of respondents having an LTCI policy declared having actively searched for such a
protection while 53.4% were offered the product, suggesting that the main channel for obtaining
LTCI is likely to be through a financial advisor or direct marketing.14
The monthly premium paid was $116 on average (at the time of the survey, one Canadian
dollar was worth the equivalent of 0.75 US dollar) for monthly benefits of the order of $2,467
in case of loss of autonomy. Finally, 76% of LTCI purchasers had some sort of life insurance
policy (whether term life or other), whereas 21.3% did not have one. Hence, life insurance is
much more widespread than LTCI.
3.2 Risks and Perception
From the microsimulation model, we compute mortality and disability risk for each respondent
based on health and socio-demographic characteristics at the time of the survey. For each re-
spondent, we need a set of probabilities of having limitations in activities of daily living at future
ages (from the current age of respondent i to age 110) and similarly for survival probabilities.
The microsimulation model yields simulated life trajectories for each of the respondents. We
estimate a set of simulated probabilities by feeding each respondent 1000 times into the simula-
tor. We use as inputs gender, age, education, smoking status and a set of health variables asked
in the survey and used in COMPAS (whether the respondent has had heart disease, diabetes,
hypertension, cancer, stroke and mental health problems). In Figure 1, we report the mortality
risk for various age groups at the time of the survey. We first compute the expected number of
years of life remaining using individual level survival risk. We then order respondents, for each
age group, by percentile of the distribution of remaining life expectancy. We report the average
mortality risk within each age group and quartile. We see substantial variation in mortality
risk at all ages, which predictably becomes more pronounced at older ages. To give an idea
of the magnitudes, an individual respondent in the bottom quartile of age bracket 50-54 has
a mortality rate at age 85 that is 2.3 times higher than an individual in the top quartile of
the same age bracket. This translates into a remaining life expectancy of 28.21 years in the
14Note that contrary to other countries (such as the U.S.), employer-provided LTCI is extremely rare in Canada.
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bottom quartile and 38.3 years in the top quartile. Hence, mortality risk modelling using survey
respondent characteristics yields substantial heterogeneity in survival risk.
We conduct a similar exercise for disability risk. In Figure 2, we report estimates for disability
risk conditional on having survived to a given age for each age group. We also see substantial
heterogeneity in risk by age. A respondent aged 90 faces a probability of being disabled, and thus
needing care, of the order of 20% to 30%. Given these risks, we can estimate the lifetime risk
of ever being disabled and that of ever entering a nursing home for at least 1 year. We present
these estimates from COMPAS in Figure 3. On average respondents face a probability of being
disabled of 56.1% but this risk is quite heterogeneous in the population. Because nursing home
stays are expensive, we also compute the lifetime risk of entering a nursing home. On average
respondents face a risk of 26.2%. Again this risk is very heterogeneous in the population.
To get an idea of the financial exposure due to future LTC expenditures, we estimate the
net present value of the expenditures associated with formal care and nursing homes for all
respondents. To do this, we need estimates of the cost of a year in a nursing home. These
costs vary. The annual cost for Que´bec public nursing homes is $43,000 (Boisclair et al., 2016).
We use this cost in both Que´bec and Ontario for illustrative purposes. Of course, respondents
never pay the full cost. So we also compute the cost using the user contribution currently set by
the Que´bec and Ontarian governments at roughly $2000 per month, which amounts to $24,000
per year, out-of-pocket. For formal care, we use an estimate of $25 per hour of formal care
and the number of hours of formal care predicted from the microsimulation model. Since the
Que´bec government offers a tax credit of roughly 33% of expenditures, we also compute an
out-of-pocket cost measure for formal care expenditures. There is no such credit in Ontario.
We then combine these cost estimates with the probabilities presented earlier to estimate net
present value measures of these costs (assuming a 3% real discount rate and no excess inflation
in LTC costs). These estimates are shown in Figure 4. If there was no insurance from the
government nor the private sector, on average, respondents would face an expected LTC cost
of $30,788. There is considerable heterogeneity in that risk. More than 10% of respondents
face a net present value of expenditures larger than $54,000. If we account for government
participation and assume respondents use public care homes, we obtain an average estimate of
$19,582 for out-of-pocket expenses. Again, more than 10% face a net present value of liability
in excess of $34,000. As expected public insurance reduces substantially the dispersion of the
financial risk. Yet, for the median respondent, this exposure represents 25.9% of his/her total
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yearly household income, or 16.2% of total savings at the time of the survey. Acknowledging
that, once in a nursing home, dependent people stay there on average for 5 years (data obtained
from COMPAS), we conclude that the residual financial risk is substantial, at least for a large
part of the population.15
But of course, decisions are based on perceptions of those risks rather than actual risks. In
the survey, we asked respondents for their estimate of the probability they would live to age
85. Hence, we can compare that probability to the one we computed with COMPAS. We can
do similarly with the probability of spending at least 1 years with ADLs and the probability of
ever needing to enter a nursing home. To compare to actual risks, we compute the deviation of
subjective expectations with respect to the objective probability computed from COMPAS. A
positive deviation indicates that the respondent overestimates the probability while a negative
deviation implies that he underestimates it. Results are shown in Figure 5. We find that
respondents overestimate their survival probability to live up to age 85 on average (Difference =
0.045), while they underestimate their probability of living at least 1 year with ADLs (Difference
= -0.080). Interestingly however they overestimate their risk of ever entering a nursing home by
10 p.p. but one should take into account that risks computed for COMPAS exclude short stays
particularly at the end of life.16 It is important to note that there is considerable heterogeneity
in these risk perceptions. Furthermore, a large fraction of respondents have trouble forming
probabilities on those events. For example, 35% of respondents could not provide a probability
of the risk of living at least one year with an ADL and 32% could not report it for nursing
home. This number was only 17% for survival risk. Hence, for those who formed probabilities
we find widespread misperception and a significant fraction who have not formed probabilities
over those events.
3.3 Stated-Preference Choice Probabilities
As shown in Table 3, overall, only 23.6% of respondents declare they have a zero-probability to
buy all five LTCI contracts proposed to them. In other words, 76.7% of respondents declare a
positive probability to buy at least one of these 5 contracts.
In Table 4, we report the average choice probability for each combination of benefits for LTC
15The average length of time with one ADL or more is on average 4 years.
16Similarly, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) compare the subjective probability of entering a nursing home within
5 years for respondents aged on average 78 to the actual decisions of the same respondents after 5 years. They find
that most respondents do not estimate correctly their true probability of entering a nursing home.
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and for life insurance. Interestingly, choice probabilities decrease with the level of LTC benefit
while they increase with the level of life benefit (except for the contract with the highest LTC
benefit). This may suggest that on average respondents prefer lower LTC benefits, perhaps
because of crowding-out from public insurance. This also suggests that there may be a joint
preference for life and LTC benefits, at least for the contract with a low LTC benefit. The most
popular contract appears to combine a monthly LTC benefit of $2000 with a Life insurance
benefit of $25,000. Of course, the variation in equilibrium take-up could vary differently since
costs vary across contracts.
4 Model
To understand the interplay between demand and supply constraints, we build a simple model
following the framework of Einav et al. (2010). Results from the survey suggest that the fraction
of respondents who own LTCI is low and that a significant fraction of respondents who do not
have LTCI has limited awareness of the product. We integrate in this framework different types
of demand-side frictions following Handel et al. (2019). The last component of our survey aims
at eliciting preferences for LTCI products. We use elicited choice probabilities to construct
estimates of demand as a function of the premium each respondent was given in the survey.
Since premiums were randomized conditional on the actuarial premium (based on gender and
age), this provides exogenous variations from which we can identify the demand function. Using
this identified demand function, and assuming competition in the LTCI market, we can then
construct an estimate of the supply curve (using estimates from COMPAS) and compare market
equilibrium under selection with the social optimum. This framework also allows us to construct
counterfactuals to study the reasons behind low demand.
4.1 Demand
There are 9 possible pairs (bltc, blife) that can be offered to participants (see section 2.1). Each
pair corresponds to a LTCI contract j with j = 1, .., 9. For each respondent i, we draw at
random 5 combinations of a contract jt and a premium pi,t = τi,tch,jt . The multiplying factor
τi,t ∈ {0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4} is randomly chosen and exogenous to the characteristics of the
individual, while ch,jt is the actuarial premium, under contract jt, for the risk class h defined
by gender and age groups to which agent i belongs. For each individual, we then have five
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observations of a choice probability qi,t that she buys a LTCI contract jt if it is offered at a
price pi,t.
We remain agnostic about the origin of these choice probabilities, but they may well orig-
inate from a well-defined expected utility model. Although approximating choice probabilities
ultimately involves giving up on some of the non-linearity a well-defined structural model would
bring, we use a flexible demand model that can be estimated from the data. Let (censored)
demand be represented by:
qi,t = max(0,−α(xi, zi,t, ηi)pi,t + µ(xi, zi,t, νi) + i,t) (1)
where α(·) controls price sensitivity of demand. α(·) is a function of 1-a set of taste shifters, xi,
2-a set of dummy variables for the contract offered to respondent i in choice situation t, zi,t, and
3-an unobserved (to us) component ηi ∼ N(0, σ2η).17 To insure well-behaved demand curves, we
choose a specification that restricts price responses to be negative (α(·) > 0):
α(xi, zi,t, ηi) = exp(xiψ + zi,tδ + ηi) (2)
The demand intercept µ(·) is given by
µ(xi, zi,t, νi) = xiβ + zi,tγ + νi (3)
with νi ∼ N(0, σ2ν). Finally, i,t ∼ N(0, σ2 ) represents randomness associated with each choice
situation which could, for example, account for uncertainty regarding the description of the
scenarios (Manski, 1999). The parameters of this model, θ = (β, γ, δ, ψ, σν , ση, σ), can be
estimated by maximum simulated likelihood (Hajivassiliou and Ruud, 1994). Upon estimating
parameters, we can construct a posterior mean for (νi, ηi), the unobserved heterogeneity terms,
using Bayes’ rules and the likelihood. We provide details on the likelihood in Appendix B.
This demand model can be used at the respondent level to get an estimate of demand in
counterfactual situations denoted qi,j(τch,j).
18 In particular, we will be interested in situations
where some of the factors measuring knowledge frictions and risk perceptions included in xi are
17We chose to censor only from below (at zero) and not at one because there is no evidence of bunching at probability
one.
18We drop the subscript t on contracts when we consider counterfactual demands.
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neutralized. We include in xi a large number of measures we obtain from the survey.
We include a set of socio-economic and health controls: dummies for risk classes (age
and sex), whether the respondent lives in Que´bec, educational attainment, number of kids
and, whether the respondent is married. We then add measures of savings and income. We
also include a dummy for home ownership. These serve as basic controls for the socio-economic
background of respondents. We also control for both expected number of years alive and disabled
using microsimulation estimates for each respondent. This controls for the respondent’s health
status. We also control for the subjective probability that the family takes care of the respondent,
and we include a dummy for whether respondents do not know this probability. This proxies
for the family network of the respondent as well as for joint preferences for family.
In terms of preferences, we include three variables. First, we asked respondents whether
they think that parents should set aside money to leave to their children once they die, even if
it means somewhat sacrificing their own comfort in retirement. We create an indicator variable
taking value one if they strongly agree or agree. We take this as an indication that the respon-
dent’s bequest motive may be driven by some underlying norm or value that leaving a bequest
is desirable. We also asked them whether it is the responsibility of the family, when feasible, to
take care of parents. We create a similar indicator variable. Finally, we asked respondents about
their willingness to take risk. We create an indicator variable taking value one if the respondent
is unwilling to take substantial or above average financial risk expecting higher returns. These
preference variables are coarse and, compared to a structural model, their effect to predict de-
mand is limited. However, they provide some useful indication of whether standard preferences
are predictive of demand for LTCI.
To account for risk misperceptions, we include the deviation between subjective (i.e.,
reported) and objective (i.e., computed with microsimulation) expected risks of survival, of
becoming disabled and of entering a nursing home. We also include indicator variables for
whether respondents reported not to know the answers to these questions.
To measure knowledge of the institutions, we include an indicator variable for whether
respondents understand that receiving private insurance benefits may influence the fee they pay
for subsidized LTC (crowding out). We include the amount they think a nursing home costs,
as well as an indicator variable if they do not know these costs, and another indicator variable
coding whether they think nursing homes are free. We also include their evaluation of the
average waiting time for a place in a subsidized home (relative to the actual average waiting
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time), and an indicator variable if they do not know waiting times.
Since, we observe that a large fraction of respondents know little or nothing about LTCI we
include controls for awareness of the product. We include two dummy variables taking the
value one if they respond they know little and nothing, respectively.
4.2 Supply
We construct synthetic cost estimates using the microsimulation model we outlined in Section
2.2. Denote by di,a the estimated disability risk of respondent i at age a and by si,a the
survival probability to age a. Voluntary lapsing occurs, i.e., respondents may stop payments
and terminate their contract. We account for lapsing using an estimate of the fraction of
contracts that voluntarily lapse each year from the Society of Actuaries (see Appendix A). The
fraction of LTCI customers who lapsed in 2011 was 1.8%. Since this fraction does not appear
to differ by gender nor age, we use this uniform estimate. Denote by zi,a = (1 − 0.018)a−agei
the survival rate of the contract owing to lapsing. We also set the real discount rate to ρ = 0.03
and the inflation rate to ι = 0.02 (since premiums remain constant in nominal terms). We can
then compute the expected discounted cost, for the insurers, of respondent i buying contract j
as
Ci,j =
∑
a≥agei
1
(1 + ρ+ ι)a−agei
zi,a(si,adi,abenltc,j +mi,aI(a<85)benlife,j),
where mi,a = 1− si,a/si,a−1 is the mortality rate at age a and I(a<85) = 1 when a < 85.
We plot on Figure 7 the distribution of costs, Ci,j , for the 9 contracts offered to respondents.
The median expected cost ranges from $20,265 for the contract offering a monthly LTC benefit
of $2,000 and no life insurance benefit to $46,515 for the contract offering a $4,000 monthly LTC
benefit and a $25,000 life insurance benefit. We observe substantial variations in the individual
costs for any given contract. The largest variation occurs in the case of contracts that bundle
life insurance with LTCI benefits. For instance, for a monthly LTC benefit of $3,000 and a
$10,000 life insurance benefit, expected cost to the insurer ranges from $19,685 to $44,481 at
the 95th percentile.
We express the total expected discounted cost in terms of the equivalent monthly actuarial
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premium, denoted by ci,j . The two quantities are related by Ci,j = Πici,j where
Πi =
∑
a≥agei
1
(1 + ρ+ ι)a−agei
zi,asi,a(1− di,a)
is the present value of one dollar of actuarial monthly premium. Therefore, the actuarial pre-
mium ci,j = Ci,j/Πi is the constant monthly payment the insurance company would need to
obtain from consumer i in order to satisfy the zero expected profit condition.
In the Canadian market, risk classification is based on gender and age. Denote by h a
risk class (say 50-54 men) and H the set of risk classes. The average monthly cost of those
who purchase the contract j in risk group h is obtained using information on the cost for each
respondent and the choice probabilities,
ACh,j(τh,j) =
1
qj(τh,jch,j)
∑
i∈h
ci,jqi,j(τch,j) (4)
where ci,j is obtained from above, ch,j is the average cost for risk group h in contract j to which
individual i belongs, and qj is the fraction of insured individuals with contract j. Adverse
selection arises when there is a positive correlation between expected cost and demand at the
respondent level. Indeed, this is the case if riskier agents (and hence more costly agents) buy
more insurance. This leads to a positive relationship between ACh,j(τ) and τ . To the opposite,
when there is a negative correlation, i.e. less risky agents buy more insurance, propitious
(or advantageous) selection arises. Hence a direct test of selection can be conducted from
these hypothetical data. Ideally, ci,j would be estimated from realized claims which would
allow for more heterogeneity in cost and hence a higher potential for selection. Despite our
rich characterization of individual level expected cost, it is possible that we miss some of the
selection which may be present in reality. However, there is considerable variance in the cost
and revenue estimates within sample and it is sufficient to allow us to test for selection based
on the characteristics we account for.
4.3 Competitive Equilibrium
The monthly premium is ph,j = τh,jch,j and τh,j is the multiplying factor yielding the market
premium. Following Einav et al. (2010), perfect competition drives insurer profits to zero, thus
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implying that the equilibrium τ∗h,j solves
τh,j =
1
ch,j
ACh,j(τh,j) (5)
where ACh,j(τh,j) is the average cost of agents i belonging to class h who therefore purchase
the contract within class h. The equilibrium fraction of respondents insured in class h is then
qh,j(τ
∗
h,jch,j).
While we will provide a comparison between the case where τh,j is allowed to vary across risk
classes, we will assume for graphical representation of the equilibrium that τh,j = τh′,j∀h, h′ ∈ H.
We refer to this situation as uniform pricing. Note that even if τ is the same across risk classes,
premiums are not as they depend on ch,j . Assuming uniform pricing allows for a graphical
representation of the overall equilibrium in terms of demand and supply in the space (τ, q). The
competitive equilibrium τ∗j solves:
τj =
1
cj
ACj(τj) (6)
where cj is the average cost over the whole population of potential customers and where
ACj(τj) =
1∑
h qj(τjch,j)
∑
h
∑
i∈h
ci,jqi,j(τch,j) (7)
We will refer to ACj := ACj(τj)/cj as the normalized average cost. There is adverse selection
when the normalized average cost is above unity, i.e., τ∗j > 1, reflecting an overall positive
covariance between demand and cost at the individual level. Conversely, there is advantageous
selection when τ∗j < 1.
The competitive equilibrium without frictions is computed similarly as above replacing qi(·)
with qˆi(·) which uses counterfactual α̂i= α(xˆi, zi,t, ηi) and µ̂i=µ(xˆi, zi,t, ηi) without frictions,
and where the .ˆ refers to the true value of the parameters.
4.4 Welfare in the Competitive Equilibrium
To simplify notation, we henceforth drop the subscript j referring to the type of contract.
Demand for individual i is
qi(pi) = max(0,−αipi + µi) (8)
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where αi and µi are shorthand for the parameters in equation 1 that depend on the individual’s
characteristics (and contract type) and pi is the price faced by the individual. We interpret
qi(pi) as the proportion of individuals with characteristic i purchasing the contract. This allows
us to use standard welfare formulas except that the value to consumers is computed on the basis
of the marginal value curve
q̂i(pi) = max(0,−α̂ipi + µ̂i) (9)
where α̂i and µ̂i are the counterfactuals without informational frictions.
At the price pi, the total value to consumers with characteristic i is the area under the
marginal value curve up to qi(pi). This is computed as follows. Consumers behaving on the
basis of the true marginal value curve (9) would purchase a positive quantity qi(pi) if they faced
a price p̂i satisfying
−α̂ip̂i + µ̂i = −αipi + µi
We take it that p̂i is positive, i.e., eliminating frictions would not reduce demand by too much
(and may in fact increase it). The total value of qi(pi) to consumers is then
Vi(qi(pi)) =
∫ ∞
p̂i
q̂i(p) dp+ p̂iqi(pi) (10)
Straightforward computations yield
Vi(qi(pi)) =
1
2
qi(pi)
(
αipi + 2µ̂i − µi
α̂i
)
(11)
Note that the latter expression is zero when consumers with characteristic i do not purchase
the contract.
Welfare is the sum of values to consumer minus the total cost of providing the insurance
policy:
W =
∑
i
[Vi(qi(pi))− ciqi(pi)]. (12)
In the competitive equilibrium, pi = τ
∗ch for i in the gender-age class h and where τ∗ solves
(6). Welfare at equilibrium can then be expressed as
W eq =
∑
h
∑
i∈h
[Vi(qi(τ
∗ch))− ciqi(τ∗ch)].
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4.5 Optimum
We consider a variant of the efficient uniform price discussed in the literature.19 Individuals
i in the age-gender class h face the price pi = τch where τ is now chosen to maximize the
welfare of potential purchasers over all age-gender classes. Welfare is computed with consumers
behaving on the basis of their true marginal value. At price pi, and using (10), the total value
to consumers i is
Vi(q̂i(pi)) =
∫ ∞
pi
q̂i(p) dp+ piq̂i(pi)
Using (11), this is easily seen to reduce to
Vi(q̂i(pi)) =
1
2
q̂i(pi)
(
pi +
µ̂i
α̂i
)
Total welfare is now given by
W =
∑
i
[Vi(q̂i(pi))− ciq̂i(pi)]
Substituting for pi = τch and maximizing with respect to τ , optimal welfare is
W op = max
τ
∑
h
∑
i∈h
[Vi(q̂i(τch))− ciq̂i(τch)] (13)
The optimal mark-up (or mark down) is denoted τ∗∗.
In the next section, for any given contract, we show figures comparing the competitive
equilibrium and the optimum with τ on the vertical axis and total quantity on the horizontal
axis, where quantity is on the basis of the demand with or without frictions.20 As τ is not a
price strictly speaking, the figures warrant some explanation. A given τ yields a total quantity
distributed between purchasers with different characteristics. To this quantity can be associated
an average cost, normalized by the average cost over all potential purchasers as in equation (6).
The normalized average cost may differ depending on whether the demand is with or without
frictions because actual purchasers will sort differently. To draw marginal cost curves consistent
with these figures, we also need to introduce an appropriate normalization. This allows, in
19See Einav et al. (2010) and Dardanoni and Li Donni (2016). The uniform efficient price, also described as the
constrained efficient benchmark, occurs when the marginal cost curve crosses the demand curve.
20In the figures, the quantity is the fraction of potential customers who purchase the policy.
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particular, the optimal τ∗∗ to be determined by the intersection of the demand without frictions
and the normalized marginal cost given the consumers’ behavior.
The first-order condition of problem (13) is
d
∑
h
∑
i∈h Vi(q̂i(τch))
dτ
=
d
∑
h
∑
i∈h ciq̂i(τch)
dτ
In words, the change in value owing to a small change in τ is equal to the change in costs. Note
that ∂Vi/∂q̂i = τch for individuals in risk class h and that dq̂i(τch)/dτ = chq̂
′
i(τch), where q̂
′
i(·)
is the derivative of each demand relative to the price.21 The first-order condition then implies
that the optimal τ∗∗ solves
τ =
∑
h
∑
i∈h cichq̂
′
i(τch)∑
h
∑
i∈h c
2
hq̂
′
i(τch)
(14)
We show that the right-hand side of (14) can be interpreted as the normalized marginal cost.
Actual marginal cost is
MC(τ) =
d
∑
h
∑
i∈h ciq̂i(τch)/dτ
d
∑
h
∑
i∈h q̂i(τch)/dτ
(15)
that is, the change in total cost relative to the change in quantity. This rewrites as
MC(τ) =
∑
h
∑
i∈h cichq̂
′
i(τch)∑
h
∑
i∈h chq̂
′
i(τch)
(16)
Normalized marginal cost, as defined by the right-hand side of (14), is
MC(τ) :=
MC(τ)
γ(τ)
(17)
with the normalization factor
γ(τ) :=
∑
h
∑
i∈h c
2
hq̂
′
i (τch)∑
h
∑
i∈h chq̂
′
i(τch)
(18)
The normalization factor does not depend on individual costs. Only the average cost dif-
ference between age-gender classes matter. When all ch are equal, i.e., ch = c for all h, then
γ(τ) = c. The normalisation is then the same as for the average cost.
A normalized marginal cost is derived similarly for the case where consumers behave accord-
ing to their demand with frictions. In Section 5.3, we discuss the case where τ is specific to each
21When the demand is positive, q̂′i(·) = −αi. When τch > µi/αi, the demand is nil and q̂′i(·) = 0.
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age-gender class. The normalization factor is then equal to c and is the same as for the average
cost.
5 Results
5.1 Demand Estimation Results
Estimates of the demand model are reported in Table 5. Given that characteristics affect both
intercepts and slopes, their total effect depends on the derivative of demand with respect to these
characteristics. Hence, we report average partial effects on demand evaluated at the average
premium presented to respondents.22
Socio-economic and Health: There are small differences across age and sex for intercepts
but significant differences for price sensitivity. Females (in particular those aged 60-64) have in
general lower price sensitivity than their male counterparts. At average premiums, females have
larger demand than men. College educated individuals are also less price sensitive and therefore
have slightly higher demand at average premiums than non college educated individuals. We
find no statistically significant differences in terms of marital status. Demand (intercept and
price sensitivity) is generally lower for individuals with larger savings and higher income, both
of which lead to a higher demand at the average premium.
In terms of expected number of years alive and disabled, only disability appears to impact
demand with a lower intercept but also lower price sensitivity, which leads to higher demand
at the average premium. Hence, individuals who are expected to have higher LTC costs also
have higher demand. Although this is potentially evidence of adverse selection, it is the overall
correlation between demand and costs within a risk class, i.e. the risk classification used by
insurers, which determines whether or not there is adverse selection (Finkelstein and McGarry,
2006). We come back to this point below.
Individuals who own a home have lower demand but are more price sensitive. As in Davidoff
(2009), we obtain that the house may act as a substitute for LTCI as it is mostly non-liquid
until individuals either die or move into a nursing home, at which point it can be sold to finance
extra LTC spending.
22For a characteristic xk the average partial effect is (−
∑
i αipiψk + βk)Pi where αi is the predicted slope of
respondent i, pi is the average premium presented to respondent i over scenarios and Pi is the probability that
demand is positive. We do the same for contract characteristics z.
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We find that individuals with a larger probability that the family provides care have slightly
higher demand for LTCI. In Canada, the LTCI contract is generally conditioned on care needs
rather than on reimbursements (i.e. actual consumption of external LTC services) so that one
potential mechanism consists in providing financial relief for children who take care of their
parents.23 Interestingly, individuals who do not know this probability have higher demand at
average premiums. The need to insure against uncertainty regarding family care may raise
demand for LTCI.24
Preferences: We find that individuals who are more risk averse and those with a bequest
motive have lower price sensitivity. However, we do not find differences in intercepts for pref-
erences which leads to positive average partial effects at average premiums. Hence, more risk
averse respondents and those with a bequest motive have higher demand for LTCI. This is con-
sistent with bequests raising the need to protect savings from future large LTC expenditures
but not with studies finding that bequest motives reduce the opportunity cost of saving and
hence generate lower demand for LTCI (Lockwood, 2014).25 Those who think the family should
care for frail parents have slightly higher demand overall.
Risk Perceptions: Biases in risk perceptions (positive implies pessimism for disability and
nursing home and optimism for survival) for disability, survival, and nursing home visits gener-
ally lead to less price sensitivity and therefore to higher demand at average premiums.26 The
results suggest that higher demand is not due to higher intercepts but to lower price sensitiv-
ity, something that would be missed if one does not allow for heterogeneous price sensitivity.
Generally, individuals who do not know these risks have lower demand.
Knowledge: Individuals who do not know that LTCI crowds-out government benefits have
lower demand and lower price sensitivity, which leads to a negative effect on demand at average
prices. Hence, crowd-out cannot explain why our respondents do not buy insurance. In Canada,
public subsidies, such as lower co-payments for nursing homes and tax credit for formal care,
are means-tested, which should reduce the demand for long-term care insurance.27
There is little relationship between incorrect knowledge of nursing home cost and demand.
23For instance, Pinquart and So¨rensen (2002) show that dependent individuals in general prefer informal help, or
a combination of informal and formal support, to purely formal support, at least for short term needs.
24Bonsang (2009) obtains similar results, providing evidence of substitution between informal and formal help, the
latter being monetary transfers which mostly result from public or private insurances.
25See also Ameriks et al. (2011) about the importance of bequest motives for late-in-life decisions to save.
26Studies by Zhou-Richter et al. (2010) and Tennyson and Yang (2014) yield similar results.
27Brown and Finkelstein (2008) find that social insurance (in particular Medicaid) crowds out the demand for
private insurance.
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But individuals who do not know nursing home costs have lower demand and price sensitivity.
This is somewhat related to Tennyson and Yang (2014) who highlight the role of one’s experi-
ence with LTC as a contributing factor to better knowing the risk of LTC costs. Interestingly
individuals who do not know waiting times have higher demand, but also larger price sensitivity,
which overall also leads to little change in demand. Hence, relatively small overall effects hide
important price sensitivity responses, as in the case of crowding-out.
Awareness: In Section 3.1, we have shown that knowledge of LTCI itself is limited. We
find that individuals who know nothing about LTCI prior to taking the survey have much lower
demand (-3.4%). Individuals who know little about LTCI have larger price sensitivity which
leads to even lower demand at average premiums (-7.6%).
Contract features: Demand for the different contracts varies. The highest demand is
observed for contracts that offer life-insurance benefits relative to those that do not. Demand is
also larger for more generous LTCI benefits rather than less generous benefits. Except for one
contract out of nine (LTCI benefit of $2,000 and life insurance of $25,000), price sensitivity is
similar across contracts.
Unobserved Heterogeneity: Overall, we find substantial unobserved heterogeneity in
demand. The standard deviation of unobserved heterogeneity is large for both price sensitivity
and intercepts. Hence, substantial variation in price sensitivity and intercepts is left even after
controlling for a large set of demand shifters.
We construct individual estimates of α(·) and µ(·) with and without frictions. Estimates
without friction are constructed by zeroing-out risk perception biases, assuming perfect knowl-
edge of institutions (of those measured) and good knowledge of LTCI generally. We denote
estimates without frictions, αˆ(·) and µˆ(·). In Figure 6, we report the distribution of the price
sensitivities. We express these parameters as elasticities on censored demand (non-negative
demand) for the first contract (since elasticities vary little by contract).
The average elasticity in the sample with frictions is 0.65 with substantial variation across
respondents. Without frictions, the price sensitivity is slightly larger at 0.69. Hence, our
respondents have relatively inelastic demand. Only 20% of respondents have an elasticity above
unit (22% without frictions). In a study using a life-cycle model approach, Ameriks et al.
(2016) find comparable results (lower than unity elasticities). Yet, two other studies focus
on the impact of tax incentives on individuals’ purchase of LTCI and find higher elasticities.
Courtemanche and He (2009) study the impact of the tax incentive prescribed in the Health
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Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 and find a price elasticity of
LTCI of −3.9 suggesting that the demand for LTCI is very price elastic. Also, Goda (2011)
examines the effect of a variation in tax subsidies for private LTCI on insurance coverage rates
and Medicaid expenditure for LTC. Using HRS data for the period 1996-2006, she finds that
implementing tax subsidies on private LTCI yields an implied elasticity of −3.3.
Hence, our estimates are much smaller than estimates using natural experiments. There are
many reasons why this may occur. First, it is possible that hypothetical stated-choice experi-
ments yield lower price responses. Yet, we are not aware of consistent evidence that hypothetical
studies underestimate price sensitivity. Second, it is possible that, given the heterogeneity un-
covered in price sensitivity, the set of individuals reacting to particular measures is different,
which could explain why estimates vary substantially. A third possibility is that tax rebates
make price changes explicit (salient) while variation in prices across scenarios do not. If con-
sumers react more, or pay more attention, to explicit changes, this could explain the difference
between our estimates and those from natural experiments.
5.2 Equilibrium Results
We now investigate the predicted equilibrium in the LTC market for the different contracts we
offered. We first look at contracts that do not include a life insurance benefit. For each of these
contracts, we construct demand as outlined in Section 4.1 above and compute costs for each
respondent as outlined in Section 4.2 which provides us with the average cost curve. We then
solve for the equilibrium relative price and quantity as outlined in Section 4.3. We similarly
derive the marginal cost function from the average cost function. This allows us to compute the
social optimum as shown in Section 4.5, assuming τ does not vary across risk classes.
Plots of those markets are presented in Figure 8. The equilibrium fraction of respondents
who purchase LTCI runs from 20.7% for the contract offering a $2,000 LTCI benefit to 14.2%
for the contract offering a $4,000 benefit (with no life insurance benefit component). Hence,
the fraction of individuals who would purchase LTCI is low (say relative to life insurance). It
remains higher than the actual fraction with LTCI in the sample. One reason is that close to
40% of those without LTCI were never offered LTCI and did not know about it. If we put
their demand to zero, we obtain take-up rates which are consistent with the observed take-up
rate. Hence, our experiment yields higher take-up rates simply because we offer contracts to
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respondents.
We do not find evidence of adverse selection. If anything, average cost is sloping upward
and the equilibrium relative price is below one. This would indicate evidence of advantageous
selection. While health tends to lead to adverse selection (those with higher expected years with
disability have higher demand), other characteristics, correlated with costs and demand, but
unused in pricing, counteract this effect. As the social optimum without asymmetric information
in this case has a lower fraction insured, we can rule out asymmetric information as a reason
for the low take-up of LTCI.
The role of information frictions is much larger. Demand without frictions (replacing α(·)
and µ(·) by αˆ(·) and µˆ(·)) is much higher at any price. In Figure 8, we plot demand, average
cost and marginal cost without frictions. The equilibrium fraction with LTCI is 30.4%, 25.2%
and 20.6% for the contracts offering $2,000, $3,000 and $4,000 LTCI benefits respectively. The
displacement of demand is for the most part parallel but this hides considerable displacement
in terms of who is insured and who is not.
In Figure 9, we report similar market equilibrium plots for contracts with a varying level of
the life insurance benefit, keeping constant the LTCI benefit at $2,000 per month (similar figures
emerge at other levels). We find very similar results with no evidence of adverse selection, some
evidence of advantageous selection and a large demand effect of frictions. Demand is slightly
larger with a life insurance benefit but that effect is not large. For example, offering a $10,000
life insurance benefit, increases equilibrium take-up from 20.7% to 22.5%. Hence, although we
have shown in Table 4 that demand was at least 4 percentage point higher when a life-insurance
benefit was offered, a smaller effect is observed in equilibrium, due potentially to costs and
selection.
In Table 6, we report the social optimum (i.e. without any supply-side or demand-side
frictions) as well as welfare loss due to asymmetric information and information frictions. Overall
the social optimum is very close to the competitive equilibrium without frictions, confirming
that asymmetric information plays a minor role. In fact, for the contract (2K, 0K), the welfare
loss due to asymmetric information (AS loss) represents less than 0.012% of the total social
optimum welfare. The role of frictions is much larger. Across contracts, the welfare loss due to
frictions is close to 18% of the total social optimum welfare. In Section 5.4 below, we decompose
frictions and quantify their separate impact on total welfare loss in this market.
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5.3 Equilibrium Results with Segmentation
In Table 7, we report equilibrium results for each risk class separately (age and gender). There
is some evidence that despite having higher demand (see Table 5), the equilibrium take-up
ends up being lower among females. But differences are not large. As for age, the equilibrium
take-up tends to decrease with age for men while the pattern is less clear for females. One
reason why there is variation across risk classes could simply be sampling variation and given
that equilibrium calculations are based on a smaller set of respondents within each risk class,
differences in simulations appear relatively small. The role of frictions remains important, even
within risk class, while the loss due to adverse selection remains very small. In Table 8, we
report a comparison of aggregate equilibrium take-up, as well as optimum and welfare losses for
the case where we allow pricing to be set within each risk class (segmented) and when it is not
(uniform). We always find a higher take up rate under uniform pricing than under segmented
pricing. In general we see very small differences when comparing uniform and segmented prices,
whether in terms of equilibrium take-up (with and without frictions) or welfare losses from
asymmetric information and frictions.
5.4 Decomposition of Frictions
As outlined earlier, we consider three types of frictions: risk perceptions, knowledge of institu-
tions , and awareness of LTCI. In Table 9, we report simulations which introduce one friction at
a time and compute the effect on equilibrium take-up (Q) as well as the welfare loss associated
with it. Risk perceptions have little effect on aggregate take-up despite correlating very well
with demand (see Table 5). Indeed, despite risk perceptions being wide-spread in our popula-
tion, at the aggregate level, positive biases cancel out negative biases so that the average bias
in risk perceptions is close to zero.28 Overall the welfare loss due to risk perceptions is small
(less than 1% of welfare in the social optimum). Knowledge of institutions and awareness play a
much larger role, but that role varies across contracts. The welfare loss due to knowledge seems
to be more important when the contract provides larger LTCI and life-insurance benefits. In
contrast, the welfare loss due to the awareness that LTCI products exist appears more important
for less generous contracts. Interestingly, the effect on equilibrium take-up of removing frictions
is not always perfectly correlated with the welfare loss. For example, removing frictions due to
28For a detailed study of the impacts of risk misperceptions on the decision to buy LTCI, see Boyer et al. (2019b).
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knowledge of institutions has a larger effect on equilibrium quantity for less generous contracts
but generates smaller welfare losses as a result of these frictions.
To understand the distribution of welfare changes, we compute each respondent’s variation in
consumer surplus between the equilibrium with frictions and the social optimum. This difference
yields a monetary amount in dollar per month. This welfare change measures the potential
individual benefit of acquiring information that collectively leads to optimal outcomes. This
amount represents the respondents’ willingness-to-pay in order to reach the social optimum, i.e.
the maximum cost of acquiring information (to remove informational frictions) they are willing
to bear. We report in Figure 10 the (cumulative) distribution of those welfare effects. We find
that the average welfare cost of moving from optimum to equilibrium is $9.98 per month with a
large standard deviation. Close to 50% of respondents have a lower welfare at equilibrium (i.e.
a negative number in Figure 10), close to 40% have similar surplus at equilibrium and at the
social optimum and a small fraction are indeed better off at the equilibrium. Given that the
price is higher in the social optimum, some of those with higher demand obtain lower consumer
surplus when we move to the social optimum. This illustrates that there are winners and losers
and that the increase in welfare is not necessarily Pareto improving.
Overall the low cost of ending up at the equilibrium with frictions, rather than at the social
optimum, means that agents should have a low willingness-to-pay for removing informational
frictions. This low willingness-to-pay is a viable explanation for the persistence of informational
frictions.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the determinants of low take-up rate of long-term
care insurance in Canada using stated choice probabilities. The typical LTCI product in Canada
differs somewhat from what is observed in the U.S. For example, most insurance companies offer
a benefit paid on the basis of ADL limitations rather than reimbursing expenses for LTC. We
exploit exogenous variation in prices across various scenarios differing on benefit structure to
derive predictions for equilibrium under selection as in Einav et al. (2010). Since we ask directly
about choice probabilities, we remain agnostic about the exact model that generates demand.
With results from our baseline predictions, we then construct a number of counterfactuals
correcting for a number of frictions (risk perceptions, knowledge and awareness) in this market.
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We estimate the welfare losses associated to these frictions as in Handel et al. (2019).
Our key results are threefold. First, we find that part of the explanation for low take-up
is simply that the near elderly, the prime target group, have limited awareness of the product,
limited knowledge of the institutions, and biased perceptions about the costs and the risks
surrounding LTC. Compared to a baseline projected fraction of the population of 20% that has
access to a $2,000 monthly LTC insurance benefit, a counterfactual where we correct for frictions
yields a take-up rate closer to 30%. Hence, information constraints (in particular knowledge of
institutions and costs, and awareness of the LTCI products) play a large role. Second, we find
evidence of weak advantageous selection, based on observed health status unused in pricing.
Yet, this effect is very small in equilibrium. Third, exploiting exogenous variation in prices from
the survey design, we estimate average price elasticities typically below one (-0.65) with less
than 20% of respondents having elasticities below -1. This is in contrast to existing estimates in
the literature (Courtemanche and He, 2009; Goda, 2011) but consistent with evidence presented
in Ameriks et al. (2016).
Although we find that there would be important potential welfare gains from increased
awareness of the products and knowledge of institutions in this market, our study suggests
that there is limited scope for take-up to reach levels beyond 30%. We can think of three
reasons why take-up may be low relative to what one would expect in other contexts. First,
public provision of LTCI, e.g. through reduced user fees, shields consumers from a substantial
part of the risk, in contrast to the U.S. where only low income (and asset poor) consumers can
benefit from subsidized LTC services. Second, older Canadians have a generous safety net which
provides substantial income replacement rates for a significant portion of the population. Third,
individuals could value consumption less when needing care than when healthy, even though
empirical evidence on this channel is still rather unclear; Ameriks et al. (ming) find estimates
that would suggest higher marginal value of money when in need of LTC while Finkelstein et al.
(2013) find that the contrary when evaluating marginal utility in case of chronic diseases.
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Figures
(a) Age 50-54 (b) Age 55-59
(c) Age 60-64 (d) Age 65-69
Figure 1: Mortality Risk Projections by Age Group: For each age group, we sort respondents by
projected remaining life expectancy and plot average mortality rates by quartiles.
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(a) Age 50-54 (b) Age 55-59
(c) Age 60-64 (d) Age 65-69
Figure 2: Disability Risk Projections by Age Group: For each age group, we sort respondents by
projected expected number of years with disability and plot average disability rates by quartiles.
These disability rates are conditional on survival at each age.
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(a) Lifetime Disability (b) Lifetime Nursing Home
Figure 3: Probability of Ever Being Disabled or Enter a Nursing Home: The distribution of these
risks are computed from COMPAS.
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Figure 4: Expected Present Value of Cost to Respondents: A discount rate of 3% is used.
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(a) Probability Live to Age 85 (b) Lifetime 1yr+ ADL
(c) Lifetime Nursing Home
Figure 5: Difference between subjective and objective risk (misperception) for survival, disabil-
ity and nursing home risks. A positive (negative) number implies the respondent overestimates
(underestimates) the risk.
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(a) With Frictions (b) No Frictions
Figure 6: Distribution of Elasticity Estimates from Demand Model: Estimates of α and αˆ in
elasticity form using the demand model (equation 1). These estimates are obtained for the baseline
contract with a 2000$ LTCI benefit and no life insurance benefit.
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Figure 7: Distribution of Expected Cost by Contract: In each panel, we report a histogram of the
distribution of expected costs, as defined in the paper, for each contract defined by the LTC benefit
and the life insurance benefit.
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Figure 8: Market Equilibrium for Contracts without Life insurance benefits: For each contract,
we compute the competitive equilibrium with and without frictions. We plot demand as well as
average cost and marginal cost curves.
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Figure 9: Market Equilibrium for Contracts with Varying Life Insurance Benefit: For each contract,
we compute the competitive equilibrium with and without frictions. We plot demand as well as
average cost and marginal cost curves.
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Figure 10: Variation of Consumer Surplus between Competitive Equilibrium with Frictions and
Social Optimum: For the contract with a LTCI benefit of $2,000 and no life insurance benefit, we
report for each respondent, the welfare (consumer surplus) at the competitive equilibrium minus
the welfare at the social optimum. The cumulative distribution function is plotted over discrete
intervals.
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Tables
Age Female Male
50-54 Model 139 119
Data 130 97
55-59 Model 183 155
Data 175 123
60-64 Model 220 194
Data 238 174
65-69 Model 291 263
Data 352 262
Table 1: Monthly Premiums from data (CAA Quebec with a 2% inflation guarantee) and Actuarial
Premiums from modelling (COMPAS microsimulation model). Sample average for $2,000 and
$3,000 per month benefit.
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No LTCI LTCI
Fraction (%) 89.48 Fraction (%) 10.52
Knowledge of LTCI (%) Knowledge of LTCI (%)
A lot 6.90 A lot 29.60
A little 53.27 A little 64.94
None at all 39.82 None at all 5.46
Why don’t you have LTCI? (%) How did you come to purchase LTCI? (%)
Never offered one 44.1 Offered 53.43
Not yet made decision 7.77 Searched myself 9.19
Used to have one 0.5 Other 37.38
Too expensive 18.97
Doesn’t cover my needs 2.25 LTC policy
Don’t need such a policy 13.97 Premium $ 115.8
Don’t know what it is 7.93 Benefit $ 2,467
Other 4.19
Do you have life insurance? (%) Do you have life insurance? (%)
Yes 68.10 Yes 75.88
No 31.07 No 21.34
Don’t know 0.83 Don’t know 2.78
Table 2: Holding of Long-Term Care and Life Insurance: N = 1819 respondents with non-missing
response to whether or not has Long-term care insurance.
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Number of 0% choice % Cumulative
0 36.55 36.55
1 13.64 50.19
2 9.38 59.57
3 8.79 68.37
4 8.01 76.38
5 23.62 100
Table 3: Distribution of agents by number of 0%-probability choice to buy LTCI over the 5 scenarios
presented.
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Life benefit
LTC benefit 0 10000 25000 Total
2000 .2713 .3128 .3328 .292
3000 .2491 .2855 .2858 .2639
4000 .2044 .2669 .2559 .2273
Total .2413 .2891 .29 .2608
Table 4: Mean choice probability by combination of LTC and Life benefit in scenarios.
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Price: α(·) Intercept: µ(·) Marginal effect
estimate se estimate se estimate
Shifters ψ β
55-59 men -0.5294 0.1300 -0.0726 0.044 0.0585
60-64 men 0.0309 0.1016 0.0595 0.042 0.0265
65-69 men -0.1712 0.0972 0.0498 0.040 0.0586
50-54 female -0.4302 0.1242 0.0243 0.051 0.0926
55-59 female -0.3172 0.1108 0.1013 0.046 0.1133
60-64 female -0.7143 0.1512 0.0131 0.064 0.1389
65-69 female -0.1934 0.1345 0.0913 0.057 0.0851
quebec 0.1922 0.0511 0.0282 0.023 -0.0202
college -0.1197 0.0541 -0.0386 0.024 0.0012
married -0.0485 0.0522 0.0163 0.025 0.0178
n kids -0.0140 0.0171 -0.0141 0.008 -0.0051
savings -0.3522 0.1038 -0.0147 0.044 0.0571
hh income -0.0851 0.0416 -0.0038 0.016 0.0137
es,x 0.0022 0.0082 0.0035 0.003 0.0015
ed,x -0.1932 0.0541 -0.0435 0.024 0.0121
own home 0.1157 0.0574 -0.0919 0.027 -0.0711
bequest motive -0.2554 0.0589 -0.0043 0.024 0.0448
risk averse -0.2728 0.0617 -0.0233 0.026 0.0378
family -0.1884 0.0484 -0.0484 0.021 0.0086
pref formal care -0.0332 0.0473 0.0435 0.021 0.0297
pr family cares 0.1065 0.0695 0.0990 0.033 0.0339
pr family cares dnk -0.2569 0.0755 -0.0764 0.034 0.0061
bias survival -0.3253 0.0920 -0.0319 0.041 0.0428
bias survival dnk -0.0178 0.0758 -0.0581 0.031 -0.0281
bias disability -0.2686 0.0902 -0.0216 0.041 0.0379
bias disability dnk -0.0445 0.0595 -0.0661 0.027 -0.0275
bias NH -0.2625 0.0954 0.1081 0.041 0.1070
bias NH dnk 0.0864 0.0643 0.0350 0.030 0.0030
no crowdout -0.1901 0.0535 -0.1355 0.027 -0.0382
bias NH cost -0.0257 0.0193 -0.0147 0.008 -0.0032
dnk NH costs -0.1925 0.0756 -0.1294 0.034 -0.0345
thinks NH free -0.0428 0.0886 -0.0285 0.039 -0.0075
wait time NH 0.0029 0.0035 0.0023 0.002 0.0007
dnk NH wait time 0.2040 0.0680 0.1345 0.030 0.0351
knows little LTCI 0.2989 0.0763 -0.0378 0.034 -0.0756
knows nothing LTCI -0.0167 0.0689 -0.0696 0.031 -0.0346
intercept -4.8856 0.2883 0.8074 0.129
Contract, ref (2k,0) δ γ
(2k,10k) -0.0938 0.0678 0.0370 0.0249 0.0373
(2k,25k) 0.1468 0.0620 0.1517 0.0264 0.0550
(3k,0k) 0.0413 0.0476 0.0926 0.0202 0.0425
(3k,10k) 0.0387 0.0712 0.1546 0.0299 0.0765
(3k,25k) -0.0432 0.0620 0.1468 0.0287 0.0874
(4k,0k) -0.0461 0.0492 0.1068 0.0227 0.0663
(4k,10k) -0.0841 0.0644 0.1746 0.0309 0.1100
(4k,25k) -0.0144 0.0567 0.2218 0.0293 0.1226
heterogeneity ση σν
0.8087 0.0254 0.2919 0.0075
logL -3058.8
Table 5: Demand Model Estimates: Estimates by maximum simulated likelihood with 50 draws.es,x
refers to remaining life expectancy at age x and ed,x refers to expected number of years with 2+
ADL. Marginal effects are average partial effects of characteristics on the (censored) probability of
purchase evaluated for the first contract (in the case of x) and for each contract (z). The average
premium faced by respondents across scenarios is used to compute this marginal effect.
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Equi (frictions) Equi (no frictions) Optimum AS Loss Frictions Loss Total Loss
(2k,0k) [0.948, 0.207] [0.96, 0.304] [0.978, 0.3] -0.00012 -0.18051 -0.18063
(2k,10k) [0.939, 0.225] [0.947, 0.324] [0.972, 0.318] -0.00025 -0.17329 -0.17354
(2k,25k) [0.91, 0.215] [0.919, 0.3] [0.963, 0.286] -0.00115 -0.16983 -0.17098
(3k,0k) [0.934, 0.175] [0.949, 0.252] [0.983, 0.242] -0.00076 -0.18605 -0.18681
(3k,10k) [0.924, 0.191] [0.938, 0.268] [0.978, 0.255] -0.00122 -0.17834 -0.17956
(3k,25k) [0.911, 0.183] [0.923, 0.258] [0.973, 0.243] -0.00188 -0.17856 -0.18045
(4k,0k) [0.924, 0.142] [0.941, 0.206] [0.982, 0.195] -0.00169 -0.19781 -0.19951
(4k,10k) [0.92, 0.17] [0.934, 0.237] [0.977, 0.224] -0.00174 -0.18492 -0.18666
(4k,25k) [0.902, 0.159] [0.917, 0.22] [0.974, 0.202] -0.00449 -0.18627 -0.19076
Table 6: Equilibrium and Welfare Computations: For each contract, we provide the equilibrium
with and without frictions, the optimum (relative price, fraction insured) and the welfare loss due
to asymmetric information, frictions (and total). These welfare losses are expressed in relative
terms (relative to the optimum).
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Equi (frictions) Equi (no frictions) Optimum AS Loss Frictions Loss Total Loss
50-54 men [0.933, 0.242] [0.942, 0.341] [0.969, 0.334] -0.00021 -0.16004 -0.16026
55-59 men [1.007, 0.23] [1.019, 0.365] [1.026, 0.363] -0 -0.16112 -0.16112
60-64 men [0.998, 0.215] [1.012, 0.295] [0.983, 0.303] -0.00025 -0.19122 -0.19147
65-69 men [0.973, 0.198] [0.99, 0.297] [0.977, 0.301] -4e-05 -0.15595 -0.156
50-54 female [0.884, 0.18] [0.899, 0.256] [0.906, 0.254] -3e-05 -0.20768 -0.20771
55-59 female [1.014, 0.174] [1.007, 0.286] [1.01, 0.285] -0 -0.24337 -0.24337
60-64 female [0.919, 0.217] [0.922, 0.305] [0.95, 0.297] -0.00027 -0.18395 -0.18422
65-69 female [1.022, 0.16] [1.037, 0.24] [1.008, 0.247] -0.00058 -0.2112 -0.21178
Table 7: Segmented Equilibrium and Welfare Computations: For the contract offering a $2,000
LTCI benefit and no life insurance, we compute the equilibrium and optimum by risk segmentation
groups (age and sex).
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Q equilibrium Q no frictions Q optimum AS Loss Frictions Loss Total Loss
(2k,0k) Segmented 0.2005 0.2953 0.2954 -0.0002 -0.1854 -0.1855
Uniform 0.2070 0.3040 0.3000 -0.0001 -0.1805 -0.1806
(2k,10k) Segmented 0.2170 0.3135 0.3126 -0.0001 -0.1789 -0.1790
Uniform 0.2250 0.3240 0.3180 -0.0002 -0.1733 -0.1735
(2k,25k) Segmented 0.1995 0.2788 0.2765 -0.0008 -0.1800 -0.1808
Uniform 0.2150 0.3000 0.2860 -0.0012 -0.1698 -0.1710
(3k,0k) Segmented 0.1634 0.2364 0.2363 -0.0010 -0.1950 -0.1960
Uniform 0.1750 0.2520 0.2420 -0.0008 -0.1860 -0.1868
(3k,10k) Segmented 0.1773 0.2493 0.2485 -0.0010 -0.1878 -0.1888
Uniform 0.1910 0.2680 0.2550 -0.0012 -0.1783 -0.1796
(3k,25k) Segmented 0.1672 0.2368 0.2333 -0.0014 -0.1906 -0.1920
Uniform 0.1830 0.2580 0.2430 -0.0019 -0.1786 -0.1804
(4k,0k) Segmented 0.1290 0.1890 0.1894 -0.0013 -0.2103 -0.2116
Uniform 0.1420 0.2060 0.1950 -0.0017 -0.1978 -0.1995
(4k,10k) Segmented 0.1542 0.2170 0.2165 -0.0015 -0.1966 -0.1982
Uniform 0.1700 0.2370 0.2240 -0.0017 -0.1849 -0.1867
(4k,25k) Segmented 0.1397 0.1950 0.1915 -0.0021 -0.2014 -0.2035
Uniform 0.1590 0.2200 0.2020 -0.0045 -0.1863 -0.1908
Table 8: Segmented Equilibrium and Welfare Computations: For each contract, we compare the
results with segmentation by risk class (τh) and those without (uniform τ).
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Q no frictions Welfare variations
Q frictions Perceptions Knowledge Awareness Total Perceptions Knowledge Awareness Total
(2k,0k) 0.207 0.208 0.248 0.256 0.304 0.0066 -0.0582 -0.1289 -0.1806
(2k,10k) 0.225 0.227 0.266 0.277 0.324 0.0068 -0.0648 -0.1152 -0.1735
(2k,25k) 0.215 0.215 0.244 0.267 0.300 0.0027 -0.1127 -0.0599 -0.1710
(3k,0k) 0.175 0.174 0.201 0.222 0.252 -0.0016 -0.1117 -0.0727 -0.1868
(3k,10k) 0.191 0.190 0.216 0.240 0.268 -0.0023 -0.1281 -0.0479 -0.1796
(3k,25k) 0.183 0.183 0.207 0.231 0.258 -0.0002 -0.1265 -0.0518 -0.1804
(4k,0k) 0.142 0.141 0.162 0.185 0.206 -0.0053 -0.1385 -0.0539 -0.1995
(4k,10k) 0.170 0.168 0.189 0.216 0.237 -0.0061 -0.1493 -0.0295 -0.1867
(4k,25k) 0.159 0.158 0.174 0.204 0.220 -0.0055 -0.1771 -0.0037 -0.1908
Table 9: Decomposition of Frictions: We compare the equilibrium quantity and welfare variation
in scenarios which implement one friction at a time (risk perceptions, knowledge, awareness).
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A Lapsing
We use data from the Long Term Care Intercompany Experience Study 2000-2011 from the
Society of Actuaries to compute annual lapsing probabilities. This study gathers information
on lapsing from 22 insurance companies. Lapsing can occur due to death or other reasons. Given
the definition we use in the paper, we want the probability of lapsing conditional on survival.
We use definition 2 of voluntary lapsing, which excludes companies where more than 25% of
terminations were of unknown cause. In the table below we report estimates of the lapsing
probability by age and gender. Because there is no clear pattern with age and differences by
gender are small, we use a uniform probability of lapsing of 1.8%.
Age Females Males
<50 0.056 0.070
50-59 0.023 0.025
60-69 0.013 0.015
70-79 0.011 0.011
80+ 0.027 0.022
Total 0,018 0,018
Table A.1: Lapsing probabilities by age and gender. Source: Society of Actuaries Long-Term Care
Intercompany Experience Study
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B Demand Estimation
The model presented in equations 1,2 and 3 has a number of parameters to estimate which we
can collect in a vector θ = (β, γ, δ, ψ, σν , ση, σ). For ease of notation, define Xi,t = (xi, zi,t, pi,t).
Let Iqi,t>0 be a dummy variable indicating whether demand is positive (1) or zero (0). Also let
the index be denoted by
pi(Xi,t, νi, ηi) = −α(xi, zi,t, ηi)pi,t + µ(xi, zi,t, νi). (B.1)
The probability of observing one particular qi,t conditional on Xi,t and ηi, νi is given by:
Pr(qi,t|Xi,t, ηi, νi) =
(
1
σ
φ
(
qi,t − pi(Xi,t, νi, ηi)
σ
))Iqi,t>0 (
1− Φ
(
pi(Xi,t, νi, ηi)
σ
))1−Iqi,t>0
(B.2)
where φ(·) is the standard normal pdf (density) and Φ(·) is the standard normal cdf (cumu-
lative distribution function).
Because the i,t are independent, we have that
Pr(qi|Xi, ηi, νi) =
T∏
t=1
Pr(qi,t|Xi,t, ηi, νi) (B.3)
where qi = (qi,1, ...qi,T )
′ and Xi = (Xi,1, ..., Xi,T )′.
Since νi ∼ N(0, σ2ν) and ηi ∼ N(0, σ2η), an unbiased simulator of the probability Pr(qi|Xi) =
E(ηi,νi) Pr(qi|Xi, ηi, νi) is given by
P˜r(qi|Xi) = 1
S
S∑
s=1
Pr(qi|Xi, η˜i,s, ν˜i,s)
where ν˜i,s is a draw s (out of S draws) from the N(0, σ
2
ν) and η˜i,s from the N(0, σ
2
η).
We can estimate the parameters θ by maximum simulated likelihood (MSL):
θˆMSL = arg max
θ
1
N
N∑
i=1
log P˜r(qi|Xi) (B.4)
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The MSL is consistent and asymptotically efficient for N → ∞ and S → ∞ (Hajivassiliou
and Ruud, 1994). For fixed S, it is biased but the bias is generally small with a large S (the
bias is due to taking a log and then expectations in the ML criteria). In estimation, we use
S = 50 and the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm to find the optimum. We
compute standard errors using a numerical estimate of the outer-product of the gradient of the
MSL likelihood.
Upon estimation, it is possible to recover an unbiased predictor of the individual effects as
ηˆi = E(ηi|qi,Xi) and νˆi = E(νi|qi,Xi). To do this, we can use Bayes Rule and compute using
draws from the distribution of ηi and νi by computing
ηˆi =
1
S
S∑
s=1
η˜i,s
Pr(qi|Xi, η˜i,s, ν˜i,s)
P˜r(qi|Xi)
(B.5)
and similarly for νi (with the same draws)
νˆi =
1
S
S∑
s=1
ν˜i,s
Pr(qi|Xi, η˜i,s, ν˜i,s)
P˜r(qi|Xi)
. (B.6)
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Long-Term Care Insurance Survey (Paper Version of Questionnaire for Internet Survey) 
 
Introduction 
 
For purposes of this survey, when we use the term ‘long-term care,’ we are referring to assistance with 
personal care needs such as dressing, bathing, getting in and out of bed, using the bathroom or eating. 
A long-term care home or assisted living facility refers to a facility that offers board, meals and other 
basic care services for persons who need long-term care.  The facility also offers medical services. It is 
therefore distinct from a retirement home, where no or limited care is offered. 
 
 
Section 1: Long-Term Care Insurance 
 
Q1 This survey is going to ask you questions about long-term care insurance. Which of the following 
best describes your current knowledge about this type of insurance?  
1 A lot  
2 A little  
3 None at all  
 
Q2 For purposes of this survey, we define long-term care insurance as a type of insurance that helps to 
pay for extended stays in a long-term care home or assisted living facility, or for personal or medical 
care in your home. It is typically separate from your health insurance and requires paying separate 
premiums. Do you have a long-term care insurance policy?  
1 Yes  
2 No  
3 Don't Know 
 
IF Q2==3 (Don’t know) GOTO Q6 
ELSE IF Q2==2 (No) 
Q3a Why don't you have a long-term care insurance policy? Choose the main reason. 
1 I have never thought about buying one, and I have never been offered one (for instance by a 
financial advisor). 
2 I have thought about buying one, but I have not (yet) made a decision. 
3 I used to have such a policy, but I let it lapse. 
4 Such insurance policies are too expensive for me. 
5 Such insurance policies do not cover my needs. 
6 I do not think I will need such a policy. 
7 I don’t know what that is. 
8 Other, open... 
GOTO Q6 
ELSE IF Q2==1 (Yes) 
Q3b How did you come to purchase that insurance policy? 
1 I was offered a long-term care policy 
2 I searched myself for a long-term care policy 
3 Other, open … 
 
Q4 What is the monthly premium on that policy, including taxes? 
Numeric 
9999 Don’t know 
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IF Q4==9999 
Q4a Is it more than $200 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
IF Q4a==1 
Q4b Is it less than $400 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
ELSE IF Q4a==2 
Q4c Is it more than $100 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
END IF 
 END IF 
Q5 What is the amount of the benefit the insurance would pay out (monthly)? 
Numeric 
9999 Don’t know 
IF Q5==9999 
Q5a Is it more than $2,500 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
IF Q5a==1 
Q5b Is it less than $3,500 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
ELSE IF Q5a==2 
Q5c Is it more than $1,500 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
END IF 
END IF 
END IF 
 
Q6 Do you have life insurance for which you currently pay a premium (or that is in force)? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
3 Don’t Know  
 
 
Section 2: Background 
 
Q7 At the present time, do you smoke cigarettes daily, occasionally or not at all?  
1  Daily   
2  Occasionally   
3  Not at all   
IF Q7==1 GOTO Q8 
ELSE IF Q7==2,3 
Q7a Have you ever smoked cigarettes daily? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
IF Q7a==1 GOTO Q8 
ELSE IF Q7a==2 
Q7b Have you smoked 100 cigarettes or more in your life? 
1 Yes 
 2 No 
 IF Q7b==1 GOTO Q8 
 ELSE IF Q7b==2 
  Q7c Have you ever smoked a whole cigarette? 
  1 Yes 
  2 No 
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 END IF 
END IF 
END IF 
 
Q8 What is the highest degree, certificate or diploma you have obtained? 
1 Less than high school diploma or its equivalent  
2 High school diploma or a high school equivalency certificate  
3 Trade certificate or diploma  
4 College, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or diploma (other than trades certificates or 
diplomas)  
5 University certificate or diploma below the bachelor's level  
6 Bachelor's degree (e.g. B.A., B.Sc., LL.B.)  
7 University certificate, diploma, degree above the bachelor's level 
 
Q9 What is your marital status? 
1  married   
2  living common-law   
3  widowed   
4  separated   
5  divorced   
6  single, never married   
 
Q10 Do you have children? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
IF Q10==1 
 Q10a How many children do you have? 
 Numeric (>0) 
END IF 
 
Q11 For 2016, what is your best estimate of the total income received by all members of your 
household, from all sources, before taxes and deductions? 
Numeric 
9999999 Don’t know or prefer not to say 
IF Q11==9999999 
 Q11a Is it more than $60,000 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
 IF Q11a==1 
  Q11b Is it less than $120,000 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
 ELSE IF Q11a==2 
  Q11c Is it more than $30,000 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
 END IF 
END IF 
 
Q12 Do you consider yourself retired? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
IF Q12==2 
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 Q12a What is your best estimate of what total income received by all members of your 
 household will be once you are fully retired, as a fraction of your current income?  
 Numeric (0%-200%) 
 9999999 Don’t know 
 IF Q12a==9999999 
  Q12b Is it more than 50%? 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
  IF Q12b==1 
   Q12c Is it less than 75%? Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
  ELSE IF Q12b==2 
   Q12d Is it more than 25%? 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
  END IF 
 END IF 
END IF 
 
Q13 Do you own your primary residence? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
 
IF Q13==1 
 Q13a What is the current market value of your residence? 
 Numeric 
 9999999 Don’t know 
 IF Q13a==9999999 
  Q13b Is it more than $300,000? 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
  IF Q13b==1 
   Q13c Is it less than $600,000? 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
  ELSE IF Q13a==2 
   Q13d Is it more than $150,000? 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
  END IF 
 END IF 
 
Q14 How much do you still carry as a mortgage, as a proportion of the current market value of 
your residence? 
1 Less than 20% 
2 Between 20 and 40% 
3 Between 40 and 60% 
4 More than 60% 
5 Don’t know 
END IF 
 
Q15 – We are interested in your pension plan and its nature, if you have one. Do you currently 
contribute to, or receive benefits from, an employer provided pension plan?  
1 Yes  
2 No  
3 Don't Know 
 
IF Q15==1 
Q15a Is your pension plan a defined-benefit or a defined-contribution plan? A defined-benefit 
plan is one where you receive fixed income in retirement for as long as you live and you don’t 
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get to decide how much is contributed and how it is invested. A defined contribution plan is one 
where you decide how the contributions are invested and you receive at retirement the amount 
accumulated from your contributions.  
1 Defined-benefit  
2 Defined-contribution 
3 Other 
4 Don't Know 
END IF 
 
Q16 What is your best estimate of how much you have accumulated in Registered Retirement Savings 
Plans (RRSPs), Tax-Free Savings Accounts (TFSAs) and other savings accounts? 
Numeric 
9999999 Don’t know or prefer not to say 
IF Q16==9999999 
 Q16a Is it more than $50,000? 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
 IF Q16a==1 
  Q16b Is it less than $200,000? 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
 ELSE IF Q16a==2 
  Q16c Is it more than $10,000? 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
 END IF 
END IF 
 
Q17 Looking at the following list of health conditions, has a doctor ever told you you had: 
[Check any of:] 
1 Heart disease 
2 Stroke 
3 Lung disease 
4 Diabetes 
5 Hypertension 
6 Depression or other mental health problems 
7 Cancer 
 
 
Section 3: Risk Perception 
 
Q18 On a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is absolutely no chance and 100 is absolutely certain, what do you 
believe is the percent chance you will live to age 85 or more? 
Numeric (0-100) 
9999999 Don’t know 
 
Q19 On a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is absolutely no chance and 100 is absolutely certain, what do you 
believe is the percent chance you will live more than 1 year during your lifetime with two or more 
limitations in activities of daily living? Activities of daily living include eating, bathing, getting 
dressed, walking about one’s home and getting in and out of bed. 
Numeric (0-100) 
9999999 Don’t know 
IF Q19>0 
 Q19a 2 or more years?  
 Numeric (Range 0 – Answer to Q19) 
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 9999999 Don’t know 
 IF Q19a>0  
  Q19b 4 or more years? 
  Numeric (Range 0 – Answer to Q19a) 
  9999999 Don’t know 
 END IF 
END IF 
 
Q20 Of course nobody wishes to go to a long-term care home, but sometimes this becomes necessary. 
On a scale of 0 to 100, what do you believe is the percent chance that you will have to move to a long-
term care home because of important limitations in your activities of daily living? 
Numeric (0-100) 
9999999 Don’t know 
 
Q21 On a scale of 0 to 100, what do you believe is the percent chance that your family would take up 
the responsibility of taking care of you if you had important limitations in activities of daily living? 
Numeric (0-100) 
9999999 Don’t know 
 
Formal care refers to that provided by qualified caregivers who are usually paid and unrelated to the 
person receiving care; informal care refers to that usually provided for free by relatives. Please keep 
these definitions in mind for the following questions. 
 
Q22 Formal care refers to that provided by qualified caregivers who are usually paid and unrelated to 
the person receiving care; informal care refers to that usually provided for free by relatives.  
 
Do you agree with the following statements? (Answers: 1 Strongly Agree; 2 Agree; 3 Disagree; 4 
Strongly Disagree; 5 Don’t know) 
Q22a It is the responsibility of the family, when feasible, to take care of elderly parents 
Q22b Parents should set aside money to leave to their children or heirs once they die, even when it 
means somewhat sacrificing their own comfort in retirement 
Q22c It is children's duty to provide their parents with informal long-term care or to pay for their 
formal long-term care, should the need arise. 
 
Q23 Formal care refers to that provided by qualified caregivers who are usually paid and unrelated to 
the person receiving care; informal care refers to that usually provided for free by relatives.  
 
If you found yourself in a situation where you needed long-term care, which type of care would you 
prefer to receive: formal or informal?  
1 Formal 
2 Informal 
3 Don’t know 
 
Section 4: Literacy and Knowledge 
 
Now we would like to ask some questions about your familiarity and comfort with financial concepts. 
Please answer these questions the best you can.  
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Q24 Suppose you have $100 in a savings account, the interest rate is 2% per year and you never 
withdraw money. After 5 years, how much will you have in this account in total?  
1 More than $110  
2 Exactly $110  
3 Less than $110  
4 Don’t know 
 
Q25 True or false? You should invest most of your money in a single stock that you select rather than 
in lots of stocks or in mutual funds.  
1 True 
2 False 
3 Don’t know 
 
Q26 Suppose the chances of someone aged 50 living to age 85 are 60%. What do you think the chances 
are that this same person will live to age 60? 
1 Fewer than 60% 
2 More than 60% 
3 Don’t know 
 
Q27 Which of the following statements comes closest to describing the amount of financial risk that 
you are willing to take when you save or make investments? 
1 I am willing to take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns 
2 I am willing to take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average returns 
3 I am willing to take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns 
4 I am willing to take under average financial risks expecting to earn under average returns 
 
IF PROV = QC  
Q28 In 2016, what is the average monthly cost of staying in a private, unsubsidized long-term 
care home (CHSLD) if you are uninsured (for a private room)? This would include the cost of 
room and board as well as that of all personal and nursing care.  
Numeric 
9999999 Don’t know 
IF Q27==9999999 
 Q27a Is it more than $3,000? 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
 IF Q27a==1 
  Q27b Is it less than $5,000? 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
 ELSE IF Q27a==2 
  Q27c Is it more than $1,000? 1 Yes 2 No 8888888 Refuse to answer 
 END IF 
 END IF 
END IF 
 
TEXT 
 
IF PROV = QC: $HOME = subsidized long-term care homes (CHSLD) 
IF PROV = ON: $HOME = long-term care homes 
 
Q29 Are [$HOME] free to the user? 
1 Yes 
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2 No 
IF Q29==2 
 Q29a In 2016, what is the monthly fee that you think you would have to pay in [$HOME] for a 
 private room? 
 Numeric 
 9999999 Don’t know 
 Q29b Is there a reduced user contribution if you have low personal resources (income and 
 assets)? 
 1 Yes 
 2 No 
 Q29c If you receive benefits from a long-term care insurance, how does that affect the user 
 contribution you have to pay in [$HOME] if you have low personal resources? 
 1 It increases my fee 
 2 It decreases my fee 
 3 It does not affect my fee 
 4 Don’t know 
END IF 
 
Q30 Is there a waiting period to obtain a room in a [$HOME]? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
IF Q30==1 
 Q30a On average, how many months do you think the wait is in your province? 
 Numeric (>0) 
 9999 Don’t know 
END IF 
 
Q31 If you purchase a long-term care insurance policy and you stop paying premiums after having paid 
them for several years, do you generally get reimbursed for what you already paid? 
1 Yes 
2 No  
3 Don’t know 
 
 
 
Section 5: Preferences for Insurance Products 
 
We are going to show you some simple insurance policies and ask you to rate those. You can assume 
that if you were to have two or more limitations in activities of daily living, the insurance company 
offering you this product would pay the benefits no matter what the circumstances. Once you receive 
benefits, you do not pay any premiums. 
 
Each product has three attributes: 
a) a monthly premium you have to pay; 
b) a monthly benefit if you have 2 or more limitations in activities of daily living, starting 3 months 
after your limitations have been verified; and 
c) a payout to your survivors if you die before age 85. 
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Assume that if you are healthy and you stop paying premiums for 3 consecutive months, the contract is 
cancelled and you lose coverage.  
 
The premium cannot increase once you have purchased the product. Finally, the benefits are adjusted 
for inflation (indexed).  
 
 
***** 
Randomization scheme 
 
Parameters: 
Benefit_ltc = [2000,3000,4000] with probability [0.33,0.33,0.33] 
Benefit_life = [0,10000,25000] with probability [0.6,0.2,0.2] 
 
With these benefits we will provide EPremium (3 x 3 = 9 data points; see table attached) which is the 
fair premium by age and sex.  
 
The premium for the contract is given by (please round to nearest dollar): 
prem = EPremium * Load where Load [0,6,0.8,1.0,1.2,1.4] with probability [0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2] 
 
Randomize both Benefits and Load independently (9 x 5 possibilities) for 5 plans (each respondent gets 
5 draws of Benefit_ltc, Benefit_life and Load).  
 
Present each plan following… 
 
Example:  
[Scenario] 
 
While healthy… Once you have at least 2 
limitations in your activities of 
daily living… 
When you pass away… 
You pay $[prem] per month You receive $[benefit_ltc] per 
month 
Your survivors will receive 
$[benefit_life] once 
***** 
 
 
Q32-36 
 
[Scenario] 
 
What are the chances, 0% meaning no chance and 100% for sure, that you would purchase the policy if 
it were offered to you by a trusted insurance company?  
 
Numeric (0-100) 
 
